Singer’s case for a level of moral equality between humans and non-humans, rather than a mere moral considerability, draws directly on our ways of thinking about moral equality between humans. Our acceptance of the latter does not depend on humans having exactly the same physiological characteristics, abilities, or level of intelligence. If that were the case, humans would simply not enjoy moral equality with one another. Clever and slow-witted people would not count as highly as the other. Yet, our presupposition [*] is that they do. The former are not given priority access to organs for transplant, and the latter are not prevented from casting the single vote that each of us is entitled to. To uphold moral, and indeed political, equality among humans, we need to abandon any appeal to identical talents, skills, wisdom or insight. We need to abandon even the appeal to the possession of a special kind of rationality which humans simply do not all have to the same extent.
But once we suspend the idea that moral equality among humans can be underpinned by appeal to some uniform feature, there will be no reason to restrict the scope of equality to humans alone. Indeed, doing so could only involve an appeal to the one thing that all humans do share, i.e. our humanity. And any appeal to this, for Singer, seems perilously close to a form of prejudice, a bias which is based on the ethically irrelevant characteristic of belonging to my group.
– Tony Milligan, Animal Ethics
Every social justice movement holds this equality of moral considerability as its central premise. You can’t deny one without denying them all. Veganism is essential to intersectional leftism.
* I disagree that this is a presupposition. PhilTube explains Simplican better than I can.










